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In this article 
Russia’s idea of the multipolar world order: origins and main dimensions 
Abstract 
Contemporary international relations are rife with the ideological struggle over the potential nature 
of the rapidly changing world order. Two distinct paradigmatic positions have surfaced. One 
champions economic, cultural, and political globalization conducted under the leadership of the 
Western world. The other advocates a more particularistic approach that fends for a balance of 
interests, multiplicity of politico-cultural forms and multiple centers of international influence. The 
latter doctrine, often referred to as the multipolar world theory, is the subject of this paper. The 
discussion argues that the idea of a multipolar world order has emerged as Russia’s main ethical and 
ideological position advanced in the international arena. Its philosophical tenets buttress Russian 
society intellectually at home, providing the expedients to pursue the country’s foreign policy goals 
abroad. The paper examines a substantial value package with roots in both Russian and Western 
philosophy that sustains the multipolar world order theory. 
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Introduction 
Deliberations on the nature of the current world order are becoming increasingly important in global 
political discourse. Two competing interpretations dominate this debate. The first is seen in the idea 
of monopolarity, buttressed by the global advance of liberal democracy and capitalism. The second 
interpretation lies in the idea of multipolarity. It advocates multiple centers of political and 
economic influence. The existence of these multiple centers of influence is sustained by normative 
pluralism in the cultural and ideological spheres and a multiplicity of political forms in the 
institutional sphere. It is significant that both approaches have deep intellectual roots in Western 
philosophy and international relations theory. A close examination of Russian philosophical and 
political debates reveals that Russia has become an ardent defender of the multipolar world order, 
both in the global and domestic public spheres. This is due in part to pragmatic considerations and in 
part to metaphysical deliberations of a historic and contemporary character that concur with some 
Western theories on the subject. 
This paper examines the main dimensions of multipolar world order theory as developed in Russia 
and explores how Western debates on world order have influenced this line of thinking. It begins 
with a discussion of the chasm between the universal and particular as argued by Western 
philosophers, highlighting authors who advocate the particular. The paper then focuses on historic 
Russian debates of a similar nature and the deliberations over the significance of cultures and 
civilizations in world affairs. A final part examines Russia’s contemporary reflections on the 
multipolar world order, its main theoretical and practical dimensions. Given that multipolarity is 
evoked to address the caveats of the unipolar world order, the paper concludes with a meta-
theoretical analysis of problems posed by both architectures of international affairs. 
Debates within the Western literature: in defense of particularity 
The moral and philosophical core of the multipolar world order evolves from the Western 
philosophical debate over the universal and the particular.11. Some thinkers might insist that the rift 
between the multipolar and monopolar world architectures boils down to economic factors. 
Kenneth Waltz argues that the idea of polarity stems from applying neoclassical economics to the 
realm of international relations. At the same time, there is a plethora of authors who could, without 
denying the importance of economic factors, claim the utmost significance of ideological variables. It 
could be argued that the debate over the primacy of either economic or ideological factors in the 
discussion on polarity in international relations is reminiscent of the discussion between rationalists 
and empiricists. This article will accentuate the ideological and philosophical line of reasoning and 
eschew the extensive examination of economic factors. This chasm stems from modernity’s struggle 
to devise a universal political arrangement for human collectives via logical deduction. Most recently 
this belief was demonstrated in Francis Fukuyama’s famous text The End of History and the Last 
Man, written after the end of Cold War in 1992 Fukuyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last 
Man. New York: Free Press. . This work stated that history had come to its logical conclusion because 
humanity was finally able to deduce the most harmonious world order based on the ideals of liberal 
democracy and progress. When the subsequent reality showed that the universal spread of these 
ideals had stagnated, some policy-makers attempted to encourage it politically and militarily. This 
led to turmoil in various areas, clearly demonstrating that the end of history still remained a distant 
goal and that alternative metaphysical deliberations were necessary. 
Many Western writers and intellectuals urged a reconsideration of the use of political theory and the 
philosophy of ethics in the praxis of international relations. The argument was that a sense of egoism 
had begun to reign in contemporary interstate interaction at the expense of considerations for 
justice, ethics, and morality (Lebow 2003 Lebow, R. N.2003. The Tragic Vision of 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511491504 , 16; 
Williams 2005 Williams, M. C.2005. The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511491771 , 4–6). Such justice 
and ethics demand the recognition of various regional and state interests, as well as the recognition 
of difference in world political cultures (Kaplan 2002 Kaplan, R.2002. Warrior Politics: Why 
Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Vintage Books. ; Kagan 2003 Kagan, R. 2003. Of 
Paradise and Power. London: Atlantic Books. ; Lieven and Hulsman 2007 Lieven, A., 
and J. Hulsman. 2007. Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World. New 
York, NY: Pantheon Books. ; Kissinger 2014 Kissinger, H. 2014. World Order. Reflections on the 
Character of Nations and the Course of History. London: Penguin Books. ). 
Broadly speaking, we began to witness a deepening of the intellectual chasm between the ideologies 
of universalism and particularity. Universalism sees the possibility of summing up the experience of 
human beings and binding it into a totality of universally applicable laws. In contrast, the ideas of 
particularity see the development of a bounded political community that can only be judged by the 
standards of its internal culture and history. This chasm transfers the discussion of 
international relations theory to the discussion on international political theory 
(Beitz 1979 Beitz, Ch. 1979. Political Theory in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Pess. ; Linklater 1982 Linklater, A. 1982. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations. London: Macmillan.10.1007/978-1-349-16692-3 ; Brown, Nardin, and 
Rengger 2002 Brown, Ch, T. Nardin, and N. Rengger, eds. 2002. International Relations in Political 
Thought. Cambridge: CUP. ; Williams 2007 Williams, M. C. 2007. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy 
of Morgenthau in International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ; 
Shilliam 2009 Shilliam, R. 2009. German Thought and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.10.1057/9780230234154 ). International relations theorists opened broad dialogs with 
writers on political philosophy, invoking the logic of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Burke, Weber, Kant, 
Hegel, Foucault, Strauss, Schmitt, Oakeshott, and others. This debate builds upon a never-ending 
series of “hidden dialogues” concerning fundamental meanings of truth and knowledge, freedom 
and responsibility, ethics and justice. 
With the emergence of the Cambridge School of historiography (led by Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, 
and J.G.A. Pocock), a philosophical approach to knowledge has become increasingly contextual, thus 
somewhat exonerating the ideas of particularity. Skinner contends that knowledge is produced, not 
in the framework of a search for a universal philosophical position, but as an exercise conducted 
within a specific context (Skinner 2002 Skinner, Q. 2002. Visions of Politics. Vol. 
1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. , 104–105; see also Tully 1988 Tully, J. 1988. “Pen is a 
Mighty Sword.” In Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and His Critics, edited by J. Tully, 7–
29. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. , 5–8; Shilliam 2009 Shilliam, R. 2009. German Thought 
and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.10.1057/9780230234154 , 10; 
Ward 2009 Ward, I. 2009. “Helping the Dead Speak: Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner and the Arts of 
Interpretation in Political Thought.” Polity 41 (2): 235–255.10.1057/pol.2008.29,  ). Dependence on 
context is further reinforced in poststructuralism and postmodernism (Lyotard 1989 Lyotard, J. 
F. 1989. The Post-modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester, NH: Manchester 
University Press. ). Foucault is perhaps the most vocal example. He goes further than Skinner by 
“depriving authors of significant agency and claiming that the “author” qua subject disappears” and 
that “the subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of its creative role and analyzed as a complex 
and variable function of discourse” (Foucault 1991 Foucault, M. 1991. “Orders of Discourse.” In Post-
structuralist and Post-modernist Sociology, edited by S. Lasch, 134–167. London: Routledge. , 148–
149; see also Foucault 1991 Foucault, M. 1991. “Orders of Discourse.” In Post-structuralist and Post-
modernist Sociology, edited by S. Lasch, 134–167. London: Routledge. , 144–146 
and 2002 Foucault, M. 2002. Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge. , 112–116; 
Shilliam 2009 Shilliam, R.2009. German Thought and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.10.1057/9780230234154 , 11). 
Practitioners of the Cambridge School and related theorists have sparked debates with liberal 
universalists (such as Leo Strauss) who often claim to uphold some ubiquitous principles of 
transcendent “morality.” The realist opponents of this liberal position claim that the idea of different 
moral foundations within different cultures, as well as an awareness of context dependence, 
represent a moral position in itself. It is a position of mutual recognition and respect, which prevents 
full-scale conflict. In this light, Isaiah Berlin’s observation that Machiavellian values are moral but not 
Christian raises the possibility of several just but incompatible value systems existing side by side 
(Kaplan 2002Kaplan, R. 2002. Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New 
York: Vintage Books. , 62; see also Gray 1995 Gray, J. 1995. Berlin. London: Fontana Press. ). Max 
Weber, the “first modern thinker to systematically develop a realist approach to international 
relations” (Smith 1990 Smith, M. J.1990. Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. , 15–16), proposed the study of the international 
environment with the assumption that one could not undertake value comparisons across different 
cultural systems and that each system had to be critically appreciated by its own standard 
(Barkawi 1998 Barkawi, T. 1998. “Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic 
Studies.” Review of International Studies 24 (2): 159–184.10.1017/S0260210598001594,  , p. 163; 
Shilliam 2009 Shilliam, R. 2009. German Thought and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.10.1057/9780230234154 , 128). 
Hans Morgenthau, on whom Weber had formative intellectual impact 
(Barkawi 1998 Barkawi, T. 1998. “Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic 
Studies.” Review of International Studies 24 (2): 159–184.10.1017/S0260210598001594,  ; 
Pichler 1998 Pichler, H. 1998. “The Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in 
Morgenthau’s Theory of Power Politics.” Review of International Studies 24 (2): 185–
200.10.1017/S0260210598001855,  ; Turner and Mazur 2009 Turner, S., and G. Mazur. 2009. 
“Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist.” European Journal of International Relations 15 
(3): 477–504.10.1177/1354066109338242,  ), sustains this line. Morgenthau 
(1948a Morgenthau, H. 1948a. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New 
York, NY: Alfred Knopp. , 267–269) argues that, despite the hopes of the liberals, there is no 
agreement on ethics, but only ethical frameworks that arise from specific contexts defined by 
nationalist experiences. His criticism of the universalist claims of the most prominent world political 
players of the twentieth century points to his pessimism over the very possibility of drafting a single 
international order based on uniform morality. It is also important that many Western writers 
consider the universalist approach immoral in the sense that it aims to deceive the world using its 
favored ethical project as a cover to pursue hidden interests. E.H. Carr (2001 Carr, E. H. 2001. The 
Twenty Years Crisis, edited by Michael Cox. London: Palgrave. , 77), for example, criticized “utopian 
moralizing as a strategy employed by the “haves” against the “have-nots”.” Just like Morgenthau, 
Carr connects this with the introduction of politics, in which the two poles with competing 
universalist claims advanced their positions in the Third World, meanwhile expanding their political, 
economic, and trading interests in those areas. 
As a final point, intellectual travails of this strand to devise a more stable world order rest on the 
idea that societies should develop freely according to their own histories and distinct moral and 
political paths. Some societies may be liberal democratic, others monarchic, republican, or 
autocratic. In some ways, the defense of the particular gives rise to the idea of large civilizational 
coalitions that would unite states with similar cultural, historical, and political patterns, as Schmitt 
and Huntington envisaged independently from each other. At the same time, this is not to be 
confused with the idea of cultural relativism, in that relativism draws a mistaken conclusion about 
the nature of the relationship between differing societies by expecting members of other societies 
to accept practices that seem vulgar or unacceptable to them 
(Williams 1972 Williams, B. 1972. Morality. An Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. ). 
Two major differences from relativism can therefore be inferred. First, disagreement with the moral 
principles of other societies is the right of any society. Second, there is a fundamental layer of the 
rules of morality that, however thin and generic it may be, is applicable to the human community as 
a whole. From this point of view, accepting violent atrocities, gross violations of human bodily 
integrity, and other fundamental forms of security, could be considered as a vulgar deprivation of 
other societies’ very idea of being human. 
These Western debates had a critical influence on the development of the Russian contemporary 
school of international relations that took a decisive turn toward the particular and the contextual in 
the vein of the classical realism of E. H. Carr, Henry Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau, and others 
(Bordachev, Zinovieva, and Likhacheva 2015 Bordachev, T., E. Zinovieva, 
and A. Likhacheva. 2015. Teoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v XXI Veke [Theory of International 
Relations in the Twenty-First Century]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. ; 
Tsygankov 2016 Tsygankov, A. 2016. “Crafting the State-Civilisation. Vladimir Putin’s Turn to Distinct 
Values.” Problems of Post-Communism 68 (2): 1–13. ). Yet, prior to dealing with Russia’s 
contemporary ideas, allow me to discuss Russian historic philosophy, which made its own significant 
contribution to the defense of cultural-political particularity. 
Russian historic parallels 
The traditional leaning of Russian philosophy was toward particularity, which resulted in the idea of 
cultural alliances and civilizations as the main units of international political conduct. It was originally 
envisaged that societies could organize into distinct civilizational cultural coalitions and such 
civilizational coalitions could be engaged in a constructive intercivilizational dialog and exchange. 
Apart from Western deliberations on this subject, nineteenth-century Russian theorizations could be 
viewed as the birth of those ideas. Russia’s intellectual life in that age was split into two competing 
groups: Westernizers (P. Chaadaev, T. N. Granovskii, V. G. Belinskii, A. I. Hertzen, N. P. Ogarev, K. D. 
Kavelin) and Slavophiles (I. Kirievskii, A. Khomyakov, the Aksakov brothers, Yu. Samarin, N. 
Danilevskii, K. Leont’ev). Westernizers admired and supported the European developmental path. 
Slavophiles revered a distinctly Russian way of life and developed a thesis on Russia as an 
independent civilization distinct from Europe in the religious, cultural, and socio-political sense 
(Walicki 1979 Walicki, A. 1979. A History of Russian Thought. From the Enlightenment to 
Marxism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. , 93–99).22. The philosophy of history of Aleksei 
Khomyakov, the idea of organic cultures of Apollon Grigoriev, historiosophy of Nikolay Danilevskii, 
and anthropology of Nikolai Strakhov have been of particular importance. At the same time, a 
leaning toward cultural particularity at the expense of universalism was a distinct tradition of 
nineteenth-century Russian philosophy across both spectra. 
While the Slavophile stance on the multiplicity of politico-cultural forms is self-evident, Westernizers 
did not refrain from a criticism of universality. Many such thinkers, including Peter Chaadaev 
(Maslin 2008 Maslin, M. 2008. Istoriya Russkoi filosophii [A History of Russian 
Philosophy]. Moscow: KDU. , 129–130; see his letters to A.I. Turgenev written in the mid-1930s in 
Chaadaev 1991 Chaadaev, P. 1991. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pisma [Complete Collected 
Works and Selected Letters]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka. ) and revolutionary socialists such as 
Nikolai Chernyshevskii, did entertain, at some points in their lives, the idea of Russia’s civilizational 
distinctness – a circumstance that divorces them from Russia’s contemporary radical liberals and 
proponents of global universalism.33. Peter Chaadaev, while demarcating the division in Russian 
political thought by arguing that Russia has no future without joining the rest of European 
civilization, still argued at some periods of his life that Russia’s distinctness could advance its 
development. In his later letter to Turgenev, Chaadaev (1991 Chaadaev, P. 1991. Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii i izbrannye pisma [Complete Collected Works and Selected Letters]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo 
Nauka. , 98) wrote that Russia has a different civilizational origin from Europe: “We do not need to 
chase someone else. We need to determine who we really are. We need to leave the lies behind and 
reassert ourselves in truth. Then we can move forward, and move faster than others because we 
arrived here later than them but we have all their knowledge and experience reflected in centuries 
of labor that preceded us.” Chernyshevskii and other revolutionaries exploited those thoughts of 
Chaadaev to argue that Russia’s civilizational distinctness could help it to organize a socialist 
revolution and set Russia on the non-capitalist way of development 
(Maslin 2008 Maslin, M. 2008. Istoriya Russkoi filosophii [A History of Russian 
Philosophy]. Moscow: KDU. , 130). The Decembrists, ideological precursors of the Westernizers, 
believed in a similar vein in the German idealistic approach, that while there can be a universal 
standard of freedom developed by external civilizations, it is down to the national spirit, love of the 
fatherland, and patriotism to set Russia on the path of enlightenment. As Christoff 
(1970Christoff, P. 1970. The Third Heart. Some Intellectual-ideological Currents and Cross-currents in 
Russia 1800–1830. Paris: Mouton. , 118) writes, 
beneath the richness and complexity of ideas and ideological currents and crosscurrents in Russia 
during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, there throbbed a third and most vital heart. 
It was the focus on the Russian individual and national self-consciousness, and in it and through it 
the Decembrists sought a solution to Russia’s major problem, that of freedom. 
These thinkers searched the Russian spirit in the process of enlightenment, reproducing the Hegelian 
idea of Volksgeist (Walicki 1979 Walicki, A. 1979. A History of Russian Thought. From the 
Enlightenment to Marxism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. , 93; 
Copleston 1986 Copleston, F. S. J. 1986. Philosophy in Russia. From Herzen to Lenin and 
Berdyaev. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.  , 23–24; 
Miscevic 2008 Miscevic, N. 2008. “Philosophy and Nationalism.” In Nations and Nationalism: A 
Global Historical Overview. 1770–1880. Vol. I, edited by H. Gantram and D. Kaplan, 85–98. Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. ). Venevitinov (cited in Christoff 1970 Christoff, P. 1970. The Third Heart. 
Some Intellectual-ideological Currents and Cross-currents in Russia 1800–1830. Paris: Mouton. , 99) 
writes: 
among all independent nations, enlightenment developed from, so to say, a patriotic principle. Once 
their products had achieved even a certain degree of perfection and as a consequence had entered 
into the composition of the universal achievements of the mind, they did not lose their distinctive 
character. 
Rajevskii, Kyukhel’beker, and Odoevskii all advocated the development of Russian culture and 
philosophy that would not be a blind copy of French, German, or English counterparts but would 
“inscribe the Russian spirit in the history of the human mind” (Christoff 1970 Christoff, P. 1970. The 
Third Heart. Some Intellectual-ideological Currents and Cross-currents in Russia 1800–
1830. Paris: Mouton. , 108). 
Yet, in their advocacy of cultural particularity, neither Slavophiles nor Westerners deployed the 
terms of political geography. They pondered the epistemology of the Russian space focusing solely 
on the specificity of its religious, cultural, and socio-political forms. They did not pay attention to the 
spatial dimension of world cultures and its implications for political relationships between states. 
Russian pochvenniki, who are considered more recent and more mature Slavophiles, attempted to 
grasp these concepts via a civilizational analysis of the world’s geographic areas – ideas that sustain 
Russia’s subsequent theorizations on the multipolar world. Nikolai Strakhov, Nikolai Danilevskii, and 
Konstantin Leont’ev were pioneers in this field (Kline 1968 Kline, G. L. 1968. Religious and Anti-
religious Thought in Russia. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. ; Kelly 1999 Kelly, A. 1999. Views 
from the Other Shore. Essays on Herzen, Chekhov, and Bakhtin. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. ).44. It is interesting that Strakhov adopted the civilizational approach to world politics before 
Danilevskii and independently from him. An editor of the journal Zarya, he published Danilevskii’s 
main work Russia and Europe in 1869 and had been publicly defending it from liberal critics, in 
particular Vladimir Solov’ev. 
Strakhov and Danilevskii examined civilizational geography through the idea of cultural-historic 
forms. Danilveskii believed that civilizations, like humans, undergo various stages of evolution as 
evident in inception, development, maturation, and decay. He distinguished 10 existing cultural-
historic forms or civilizations: Egyptian, Chinese, Assyrian-Babylonian, Indian, Iranian, Jewish, Greek, 
Roman, neo-Semitic or Arabian, and Germanic-Roman or European. The eleventh type was Russian-
Slavic, which Danilevsky believed was in the process of inception during the nineteenth century 
(Kline 1985 Kline, G. L. 1985. “Russian Religious Thought.” In Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in 
the West, edited by N. Smart, J. Clayton, P. Sherry and Steven T. Katz, 179–
230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511520235 , 194; 
Christoff 1991 Christoff, P. K. 1991. An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Russian Slavophilism. Yu. 
F. Samarin. Oxford: Westview Press. , 406–418). This theory is similar to Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” thesis, although it allows for some additional conclusions with consequence for 
multipolar world order development and contemporary ideas of multiculturalism. 
First, Danilevskii demands to examine the distinctness and originality of existing world cultures. It is 
important that the comparison of cultures is conducted on the basis of a culture’s structures and 
developmental laws, and not on “external” achievements. This idea is close to a contemporary 
“politics of recognition” advanced in the twentieth century by the multicultural theories of Charles 
Taylor and to the spectrum of ideas of the Cambridge School discussed earlier. Second, Danilevskii 
insists that people’s traditions and customs buttress the uniqueness of all cultures and must be 
cherished. Third, he warned against the danger of mimicking and imitating other cultures. This again 
reminds us of the Taylorian (1994 Taylor, C. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism, 
edited by Amy Gutman, 25–75. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. , 31) politics of recognition, 
in which 
a volk should be true to itself, that is to its own culture. Germans should not try to be derivative and 
(inevitably) second-rate Frenchmen… The Slavic peoples had to find their own path. And European 
colonialism ought to be rolled back to give the peoples of what we now call the Third World their 
chance to be themselves unimpeded. 
Finally, Danilevskii refuted a claim that one culture (in particular the European one) has an absolute 
universal value (Belov 2010 Belov, A. V. 2010. “Foreword.” In Bor’ba s Zapadom [Struggle with the 
West], edited by N. Strakhov, 5–36. Moscow: Institut Russkoi Tsivilizatsii. , pp. 12–3) – a thesis 
endorsed by many contemporary critics of Euro-centrism (Hobson, Eisenstadt, Gray, Williams, 
Parekh) and the realist international relations thinkers discussed earlier. In this light, many Russian 
intellectuals (Mezhuev 2012 Mezhuev, B. V. 2012. Comments at the forum on “Danilevskii: zabytyi 
genii Russkoi filosofii.” [Danilevskii: Forgotten Genius of Russian Philosophy.] moderated by V. T. 
Tretyakov. Chto Delat?, No. 339, December 9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zYAE9jlmopk ; 
Tretyakov 2012 Tretyakov, V. T. 2012. Comments at the forum on “Danilevskii: zabytyi genii Russkoi 
filosofii [Danilevskii: Forgotten Genius of Russian Philosophy].” moderated by V. T. Tretyakov. Chto 
Delat?, No. 339, December 9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zYAE9jlmopk ; Bordachev, 
Zinovieva, and Likhacheva 2015 Bordachev, T., E. Zinovieva, and A. Likhacheva. 2015. Teoriya 
mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v XXI Veke [Theory of International Relations in the Twenty-First 
Century]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. ) claim that Danilveskii’s ideas could be invoked 
in defense of the equality of the world’s political cultures, their peaceful co-existence, mutual 
questioning, and recognition. 
It is important that some Western historians of ideas (Walicki 1979 Walicki, A. 1979. A History of 
Russian Thought. From the Enlightenment to Marxism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. , 114; 
Kline 1985 Kline, G. L. 1985. “Russian Religious Thought.” In Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in 
the West, edited by N. Smart, J. Clayton, P. Sherry and Steven T. Katz, 179–
230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511520235 ; 
Copleston 1986Copleston, F. S. J. 1986. Philosophy in Russia. From Herzen to Lenin and 
Berdyaev. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.  ; Christoff 1991Christoff, P. K. 1991. An 
Introduction to Nineteenth Century Russian Slavophilism. Yu. F. Samarin. Oxford: Westview Press. , 
406–418; Kelly 1999 Kelly, A.1999. Views from the Other Shore. Essays on Herzen, Chekhov, and 
Bakhtin. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. , 154–155; Duncan 2000 Duncan, P. 2000. Russian 
Messianism. New York: Routledge.10.4324/9780203442357 , 30–47; 
Riasanovsky 2005 Riasanovsky, N. 2005. Russian Identities. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195156508.001.0001 ) accuse Danilevskii, Strakhov, and Leont’ev of 
nationalism and pan-Slavism. We may, however, argue that Danilevskii did not believe that the 
eschatological task of the Slavs was in finding the right solution for all of humankind. In turn, many 
Western positivist philosophers and policy-makers of the nineteenth century shared this ambition 
within the framework of European colonialism (Kymlicka 1995 Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural 
Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 52–53). Danilevskii believed that the Slavs must 
organize their own civilization in such a manner that it would be capable of developing alongside 
other historic-cultural forms. While Russians were indeed to be the leaders of their civilization (a 
thesis that rightly allowed his critics to accuse him of nationalism), this idea still laid the foundation 
for a multipolar vision of the world, in which various countries of a similar cultural and historic path 
could merge into larger civilizations and develop these civilizations into the main subjects of history. 
Danilevskii’s ideas were the first to touch upon geographic issues and the legitimacy of the use of 
power outside civilizational borders. Departing from Danilevskii’s theorizations, Strakhov considered 
the Polish revolt of 1863 as entirely legitimate. Poland, in Strakhov’s view, belonged to the West 
European civilization and it was unjust to hold it within the bounds of the Russian civilization 
(Belov 2010 Belov, A. V. 2010. “Foreword.” In Bor’ba s Zapadom [Struggle with the West], edited 
by N. Strakhov, 5–36. Moscow: Institut Russkoi Tsivilizatsii. ). Hence, he did not believe in the moral 
virtue of crushing the uprising. This raises a more significant question of the proportionality of state 
power and its moral significance – an issue discussed by Morgenthau, Weber, and Schmitt that 
remains topical in many modern conflicts where success in military warfare is rarely matched by 
political, moral, and discursive achievements. 
This thought gave rise to early Eurasianism, which advocates cultural particularity from a territorial 
and geographical point of view. As a distinct line of thought, Eurasianism also had a general 
philosophical application, for it exerted intellectual influence on structuralism through the work of 
Roman Jakobson (1896–1982). The founding fathers of Eurasianism were linguist and philosopher 
Prince N. M. Trubetskoi (1890–1938) and economist and geographer Peter Savitskii (1895–1965).55. 
Eminent historian G. V. Vernadskii (1877–1973), jurist and philosopher N. Alekseev (1879–1964), 
historian and theologian V. N. Il’in (1891–1974), and theologian G. Florovskii (1893–1979) have all 
left a mark in the Eurasian philosophy. Prince Trubetskoi granted cultural diversity an almost divine 
nature. He deployed the tale of the Tower of Babel to argue that the Bible preferred a variety of 
languages to just one. Trubetskoi viewed cultural and linguistic homogeneity as a sin that led to 
spiritual emptiness and the arrogant project of erecting the Tower. The ensuing “confounding of 
languages,” which was essentially an imposition of cultural diversity, was not a curse but a benign 
solution given to humanity in order to prevent it from the sin of cultural homogeneity 
(Ryazanovsky 1993 Ryazanovsky, N. V. 1993. “Prince N.S. Trubetskoi’s Europe and Mankind.” 
In Collected Writings, edited by N. V. Ryazanovsky, 207–220. Los Angeles: Charles Schlacks. ; 
Miscevic 2008 Miscevic, N. 2008. “Philosophy and Nationalism.” In Nations and Nationalism: A 
Global Historical Overview. 1770–1880. Vol. I, edited by H. Gantram and D. Kaplan, 85–98. Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. , 94). 
Eurasianism concurs with the claims of the Cambridge School that knowledge, beauty, and ideas are 
contingent on the socio-historic and cultural context. Based on this, Eurasianism concludes that the 
world must be viewed as a multiplicity of civilizations, each existing within its own time, deploying its 
own taxonomy of goods and traditions, and relying on its own incommensurable value systems. 
Those civilizations survive diachronically being scattered throughout space and undergoing differing 
stages of inception, flourishing, and decline.66. This parallels the idea of diachronic existence 
developed by Claude Levi-Strauss in his anthropological studies. From this follows Eurasianism’s 
criticism of the modernist idea of progress, in which each stage of human development is superior to 
its predecessor. Its proponents claim that such an understanding represents a socially constructed 
myth, which serves the purpose of judging a culture’s achievements by an external measure. This 
myth states that the social being is a function of time and that each stage of human development 
internalizes the best from its predecessor and creates new and superior forms of being. 
Contemporary Russian debates on a multipolar world 
Let us now examine the conclusions drawn from the lessons of Western and Russian thought by 
contemporary Russian intellectuals who advocate a multipolar world order. The emphasis on 
cultural distinctiveness and civilizational dialog among world communities leads to further 
development of the notion of civilization as the subject of international politics. This is perhaps the 
cardinal difference between multipolar world order theory and its rational, critical, and postmodern 
counterparts. Western theories of international relations propose the state (realism and liberalism) 
or international discourse (postmodernism and critical theory) or social class (Marxism) as the main 
subject of international relations. Multipolar world ideologists (such as Bordachev, Dugin, Fursov, 
Delyagin, Leont’ev, Kurginyan, and Kholmogorov) shift away from this understanding and consider 
civilizations as a new subject of international politics. 
At this point it is important to distinguish between theoretical and practical dimensions of 
multipolarity. The chasm stems from the impact that the idea of civilization as a subject of 
international politics has on the idea of state sovereignty. At the theoretical level, the multipolar 
world approach tends toward a diminished state sovereignty within the framework of cultural–
civilizational alliances. Sovereignty, as it presently stands, is a category that must be transcended in 
the future in favor of sovereignty of the alliance – a dynamic that can be witnessed in the European 
Union. By the same token, the multipolar world arrangement could expect some form of diminished 
sovereignty from member states of other civilizational alliances but endorse full sovereignty of the 
alliance as a cultural and political union and a member of the world political process. However, at 
the practical level, recasting the idea of state sovereignty seems premature. From this point of view, 
practical multipolarity considers state sovereignty as a favorable transitional status and an expedient 
instrument for preserving cultural distinctness and self-standing in the rapidly globalizing world. Let 
us examine more closely the reasoning of both sides of the multipolar world theory spectrum. 
Sovereignty and civilization: theoretical dimensions 
At the theoretical level, taking civilizations as the main actors of international relations would 
necessitate the precise definition of a civilization in terms of its size, borders, and structures of 
internal governance. To define a civilization in the most flexible terms, Dugin 
(2012 Dugin, A. 2012. The Fourth Political Theory. London: Arktos. ) proposes to deploy the Platonian 
notion of politeia – which represents a political unit of unidentified size (a city, a country, or a union 
of countries). A civilization can then be viewed as an imprecise form that unites a number of 
countries on the basis of their culture, history, philosophy, traditions, and religious consciousness. 
From this it follows that civilization, as a cultural political union, would require the process of 
regional integration and redefinition of sovereignty as a result. 
From a philosophical point of view, moving away from the idea of state sovereignty to the notion 
of civilizational sovereignty partly rests on propositions of the English School of international 
relations. This is because the English School questions the nature of state sovereignty in the 
contemporary world and implies that the division of states into varying categories is based on their 
ability to influence the international relations discourse. At the international level, the English School 
views sovereignty as the ability to pursue an independent course of action within the given social 
environment of a state’s interaction (Manning 1975 Manning, C. A. W. 1975. The Nature of 
International Society. London: Macmillan.10.1007/978-1-349-02704-0 ; James 1986 James, A. 
M. 1986. Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. London: Allen & Unwin. ). English 
School advocates claim that order among sovereign states is sustained via international institutions 
that involve established social practices of interaction and a variety of nonstate and nonterritorial 
actors (Manning 1975 Manning, C. A. W. 1975. The Nature of International 
Society. London: Macmillan.10.1007/978-1-349-02704-0 , 177, 201; James 1986 James, A. 
M. 1986. Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. London: Allen & Unwin. ; 
Bull 2000 Bull, H. 2000. “Justice in International Relations.” In Hedley Bull on International Society, 
edited by Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, 206–245. London: Macmillan. , 242). This process is 
closely intertwined with the thickening of international rules in the economic sphere and the de 
facto division of countries into rich industrialized states that determine the parameters of interactive 
practice and poorer peripheral areas that have to follow the established rules 
(Suganami 2010 Suganami, H. 2010. “The English School in a Nutshell.” Ritsumeikan Review of 
International Studies 9 (1): 15–28. ). 
Multipolar world ideology adopts this description of the contemporary world, yet it deploys it in 
defense of regional civilizational integration and in the advocacy of the civilizational 
sovereignty idea. It concurs with the suspicions of Carr, Morgenthau, and other scholars such as 
Desch, Owen, Oren, and Williams who posit that, since the world order is buttressed by the extant 
system of socio-political interaction among states, this order must benefit the powerful within the 
system. Here, Russian intellectuals follow the ideas of Western thinkers in that the social narrative, 
as Foucault claims, is intimately linked to power. Hence, those countries that are able to influence 
the interactive discourse within the society of supposedly sovereign states would have a privileged 
position in drafting the rules of conduct for the others. This essentially violates the principles of the 
Westphalian system, in which all sovereign states are considered equal. This arrangement also 
compels weaker states to function within the system, the rules of which they did not actively draft. 
Multipolar world theorizations deploy these ideas advocating civilizational integration of states 
based on the states’ cultural and political similarities. Such integration, this theory claims, would 
help weaker states obtain a more prolific voice in the process of drafting a world order discourse. It 
could also explain the weakening of state sovereignty and its replacement with civilizational (or 
alliance) sovereignty. 
In this light, the “pluralism of civilizations” becomes a cardinal value of the theoretical strand of the 
multipolar world model. Each civilization, it is argued, must have the right to its own value system 
and its particular way of development. International anarchy can therefore be considered as the 
anarchy of civilizations as opposed to the anarchy of states, which, according to the English School of 
international relations, is becoming increasingly obsolete. Once we accept the civilizational 
interpretation of international reality, the Euro-Atlantic civilization loses its claim to universality and 
obtains a regional character. Other civilizations may adopt what they see fit from the Euro-Atlantic 
experience and cast aside what they deem harmful to their existence. This thought echoes many of 
the arguments of the Slavophiles and pochvenniki. In particular, it continues Danilevskii’s 
theorizations concerning the selective transfer of knowledge in the course of intercivilizational 
evolution. These theorizations claim that civilizations could selectively borrow elements from other 
civilizations that they deem useful and discard those they consider inapplicable. Such ideas would 
ensure that civilizations remain in a dialog, but this will be a critical and mutually interrogating 
dialog. The relationship between civilizations would therefore rest on the conception of normative 
pluralism and multiplicity of cultural and political forms (Sakwa 2015 Sakwa, R. 2015. “The Death of 
Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine.” International Affairs 91 (3): 553–
579.10.1111/inta.2015.91.issue-3,  , 557–558). 
Sovereignty and civilization: practical dimensions 
From a practical point of view, redrafting of the idea of sovereignty would invariably entail a 
significant recasting of the extant world order. Arguably, such a restructuring could develop along 
two different trajectories. The first trajectory concurs with the deliberations on states becoming 
bound by the practice and narrative of their mutual interaction, which diminishes the international 
sovereignty of states. The second encompasses the very theoretical aspects of the multipolar world 
thinking that we have just examined above. Here, post-sovereign states unite to form strong cultural 
alliances that create a cross-civilizational narrative of interaction. Both cases are problematic. 
In the first case, many Russian intellectuals, much in the vein of their Western colleagues, lament the 
fact that this path would compel states to comply with global, and thereby America-centered, 
standards of political behavior both on the domestic and international scenes. Moving toward such a 
system, they argue, would invariably lead to a homogenization of political norms and forms across 
the globe – a process they could not agree with when armed with the Western and Russian historical 
theorizations examined above. The second scenario is also difficult, for the processes of regional 
cultural integration remain nascent, perhaps with the exception of the European Union. While 
similar processes are taking place in Latin America, the former Soviet space, the Islamic world, and in 
Africa, they cannot be compared in depth and speed with their European counterpart. 
Given that the second scenario is difficult to implement in practice, proponents of practical 
multipolarity opt for a more conservative approach. At the practical level, multipolarity aims to 
sustain the extant world order based on the Westphalian and Yalta-Potsdam systems, with some 
minor yet consequential modifications. It adopts a rather conservative outlook, seeing this 
arrangement as a favorable transitional condition en route to the fully fledged practice of 
civilizational (or theoretical) multi-polarity consisting of the strong regional alliances advocated at 
the theoretical-ideological level. 
The extant order is based on five main principles: (1) the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty; (2) 
the formal assumption that the United Nations is the most important international institution; (3) 
the composition of the United Nations Security Council consists of the victors of World War II; (4) the 
existence of a strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Russia; and (5) the presence of 
the Bretton-Woods financial system.77. The fall of the USSR and the dismantling of the “socialist 
bloc” added an additional layer to this system, creating the supposition that Russia’s international 
standing has been significantly weakened relative to the 1970s. At the same time, this additional 
post-1991 layer can be considered cursory, inasmuch as the essence of the five-tier construct 
remained unchanged. Russia’s geopolitical retreat in 1991 has not been institutionalized. No 
comprehensive document was signed that states that Russia was the losing party in the cold war and 
therefore must, due to this situation, assume certain obligations that could restrict its sovereignty or 
freedom of action in the international arena. Russia retained its seat on the UN Security Council, 
preserved its nuclear potential, and inherited the remaining arsenals from the other former Soviet 
republics. Despite its visible economic downturn during the 1990s, Russia remained the only country 
that possesses the scientific-technological and research potential to compete with the United States 
in the military sphere and in the exploration of space (Leont’ev 2015 Leont’ev, M. 2015. “V nachale.” 
[In the Beginning.] RadioVesti.ru, August 
10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ku6FNIybN78  ). With the exception of the fifth principle 
and minor modification of others, practical multipolarity desires for this order to be stable and 
gradually evolving toward a more inclusive multipolar arrangement. 
First, Russian intellectuals uphold the classical idea of state sovereignty as a tactical means of 
preserving the cultural and political distinctiveness of various states in the world and combating the 
uniformity of the global culture narrated in the West, without the full participation of the “rest” of 
the world. Sovereignties must be sustained as an expedient instrument that could allow the idea of 
normative pluralism to capture the dominant discourse. Simultaneously, countries should unite into 
cultural, political, and civilizational unions to advance the idea of civilizational diversity. These two 
processes – sustaining sovereignty and forming cultural unions – could advance in parallel, mutually 
reinforcing each other. Such an approach is evident in the ideology of the Eurasian Union that 
proposes integration of the post-Soviet space based on the idea of a plurality of cultural and political 
forms within the Union, thus accepting the idea of domestic sovereignty in Schmittian terms. This 
offers integration on the basis of a common history and common understanding of political 
processes taking place in the contemporary world. 
Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov argues that state sovereignty and the ability to 
sustain the multiplicity of cultural and political forms remains the cornerstone of international 
security and lasting peace. In a speech to the Russian State Duma in October 2015, Lavrov insisted 
on creating a more just, polycentric, and stable world order (Lavrov 2015 Lavrov, S. 2015. 
“Vystuplenie Lavrova v Gosdume [Lavrov Address to the State Duma].” RT, October 
14. https://russian.rt.com/article/123511 ). He claimed that imposing a particular political and 
developmental model on various countries would lead to increased chaos, anarchy, and would be 
met with resistance from many states. Lavrov pointed out that Russia does not expect other states 
to sacrifice their prosperity for the sake of particular ideas or political doctrines and that no country 
must be compelled to adopt any particular developmental model considered optimal by other 
states. These claims may seem odd, particularly to Western observers, in light of events in Crimea, 
eastern Ukraine, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, in which Russia influenced political events. Yet, as 
Richard Sakwa (2016 Sakwa, R. 2016. “Barkhatnye perchatki zapadnoi gegemonii [The Velvet Gloves 
of Western Hegemony].” Valdai Club, October 12. http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/barkhatnye-
perchatki-zapadnoy-gegemonii/ ) notes, most official statements by Russia on such occasions 
demonstrate little regarding normative and ethical notions, but reveal Russia’s disdain and 
ideological resistance to “Western mentorship” in all spheres of socio-economic and political life. 
Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often adhered to this line 
of reasoning when faced with criticism of Russia’s international behavior.88. Zakharova argues that, 
in the case of Ukraine, Western powers have been consistently influencing domestic politics since 
the first Orange Revolution of 2004, which is indeed well documented by a large number of Western 
scholars from a variety of perspectives (see Åslund and MacFaul 2006 Åslund, A., 
and M. MacFaul. 2006. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic 
Breakthrough.Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ; 
Lane 2008 Lane, D. 2008. “The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary 
Coup?” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (4): 525–549.10.1111/j.1467-
856x.2008.00343.x,  ). Zakharova also lamented the situation in which high-ranking Western leaders 
frequented the 2014 Maidan rallies and publicly supported the demise of President Victor 
Yanukovich’s government. Furthermore, Western powers did not object to the ousting of 
Yanukovich the day after the German and Polish foreign ministers, as well as a high-ranking French 
Foreign Ministry official, mediated and witnessed the signing with the Yanukovich administration of 
a roadmap toward settling the political crisis. Russian officials argued that, against the backdrop of 
open Western support for political forces beneficial to Western interests, Russia would support its 
own interests and enable the Russian population of Ukraine to pursue its civilizational choice. Hence, 
we are witnessing a clash of geopolitical interests between Russia and the West that is linked to the 
struggle over civilizational spheres of influence. 
Following from this, the role of the UN also seems central for Russia in the framework of the 
multipolar world order. Putin in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2015 claimed 
that Russia understands that “the world is changing and that the United Nations must be consistent 
with this natural transformation” (Putin 2015 Putin, V. 2015. “Vladimir Putin prinyal uchastie v 
plenarnom zasedanii yubileinoi, 70-i sessi General’noi Assamblei OON v N’yu-Iorke.” [Vladimir Putin 
Took Part in the Plenary Meeting of the 70th Anniversary Session of the UN General Assembly in 
New York.] September 28. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385 ). At the same time, 
Russia considers all 
attempts to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the UN as extremely dangerous. This can lead 
to a collapse of the entire architecture of international relations. Then indeed we would be left with 
no other rules than the rule of force. We would get to a world dominated by selfishness rather than 
collective work. A world increasingly characterized by dictate rather than equality, genuine 
democracy, and freedom. A world where truly independent states would be replaced by an ever 
growing number of de facto protectorates and externally controlled territories. 
Being adamant about sustaining the idea of sovereignty, the particularity of political-cultural 
development, and the central role of the UN as a guarantor of the international legal framework, 
Russia is aiming to change the fifth principle concerning the Bretton-Woods financial system. This 
could be done through trading using regional currencies and the introduction of regional financial 
institutions as alternatives to the World Bank, IMF, and US credit rating agencies. Such a change 
would challenge the dominance of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency and as a result 
question the political power of the United States in the world arena. It could also ensure a 
redistribution of control over financial resources across the globe, thereby giving more tangible 
sovereignty to other states and centers of influence. 
This idea also could run counter to the wishes and intentions of transnational corporations that 
would prefer to have uniform and coherent rules of operation and potentially a currency with which 
they can function, as well as a center of influence that can regulate global rules of the trading game. 
From this point of view, Russia’s plan seems unsustainable, just as the idea of the Holy Alliance 
between Russia, Austria, and the Kingdom of Prussia that concluded on 26 September 1815 with the 
intention of restraining secularism and republicanism in Europe in the wake of the French Revolution 
and devastating wars, which went against the grain of growing capitalism and enterprise prominent 
in the nineteenth century. 
The significance of the multipolar world ideology 
The multipolar world concepts and propositions remain significant in that they have arisen in 
response to a number of processes taking place in the contemporary world. Three main factors 
invoked the development of multipolar world theory. First, the unipolar order began to experience 
significant difficulties in the course of its entrenchment. Recent turmoil in the Middle East, the 
refugee crisis, and political challenges in other parts of the globe have demonstrated that a single 
force cannot manage world affairs successfully and that the participation of other players is 
necessary to ensure lasting peace and stability. 
Second, the unipolar world order has not been framed institutionally, which results in further 
predicaments in terms of legitimacy. Indeed, during the past quarter of a century the United States 
created a series of precedents – such as “humanitarian intervention,” “regime change,” and 
“disarmament” – that could consolidate its global leadership and frame the major dimensions of the 
unipolar world. 
The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a political commitment endorsed by all UN members 
states at the 2005 World Summit, has been problematized by many Russian international relations 
scholars. These scholars argue that the emergence of R2P is a response to the unclear nature of 
“humanitarian interventions” and welcomed the doctrine as a step toward clarification of the 
circumstances under which interventions could occur and toward the enforcement of the role of the 
United Nations Security Council in the process.99. Professor V. Kotlyar of the Diplomatic Academy of 
Russia’s Foreign Ministry was particularly vocal on this point during a roundtable discussion March 
2012 (Kruglyi stol 2012 Kruglyi stol. 2012. “Kruglyi stol. Otvetstvennost’ za zashchiti [Roundtable. 
Responsibility to Protect].” April 12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VEudC0Ifpt8 ). Yet, as 
Maria Zakharova insists, all such steps represented a series of practices in differing political conflicts 
that have yet to be converted into positive and comprehensive international law, consolidating 
unipolarity.1010. Zakharova’s comments were made during the television broadcast Spetsial’nyi 
Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 2015 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw). 
The third challenge stems from regional alliances that are emerging in various parts of the globe. The 
formation of BRICS, as well as the integration processes within Latin America, the post-Soviet space, 
and Asia and Africa, all could challenge the global domination of the West. This being said, 
multipolarity has not become a permanent feature of international relations either. The world is 
now locked in a stalemate of sorts, a rather unstable balance between multipolarity and unipolarity. 
For Russia, advancing the ideas of multipolarity has become expedient for its desire to remain a 
significant voice in the international arena. Dugin (2012 Dugin, A. 2012. The Fourth Political 
Theory. London: Arktos. ) argues that contemporary Russia alone is incapable of defending its 
national interests. Apart from notions of multipolarity, Russia does not have a coherent ideology 
that could be exported as, for example, Marxism and Communism had been during the Soviet 
period. Neither does it have adequate military means to sustain such an ideological export. Hence, 
the return of a bipolar world, in which Russia is able to act as a counterweight to the West, is no 
longer a possibility. That defenders of the unipolar world have a coherent ideology, military 
complex, and economic means, to advance their political project exacerbates Russia’s position. 
Indeed, human rights, globalism, consumerism, cosmopolitanism, and capitalism sustained by the 
neoliberal project are easily exportable and appealing to many of its supporters across the world. 
In this light, forming alliances with those who are critical of the unipolar world order is a powerful 
instrument that remains for Russia in its claims to assert global influence. Hence, Russia’s elite 
considers this civilizational ideology a distinct intellectual product, which it can offer to the world 
(Tsygankov 2016 Tsygankov, A. 2016. “Crafting the State-Civilisation. Vladimir Putin’s Turn to Distinct 
Values.” Problems of Post-Communism 68 (2): 1–13. ). Proponents of this ideology claim that the 
multipolar world architecture can only have a dialogical character, as opposed to the unipolar world 
that is mostly based on the normative monolog of liberal democratic states. The task of the 
multipolar world ideology, they argue, is to reconstruct the extant discourse on international affairs 
in a way that could incorporate the ideas of particularity, cultural-historic context, multiplicity of 
political forms, and unimpeded independent development. 
These ideas have become a leitmotif of Russian intellectuals and foreign policy ideologues of the late 
Putin period. Russia’s insistence on multipolarity is often framed as a proposal to create a new 
“world order” that could be fairer to all and devoid of various forms of “crusading universalisms” 
(Williams 2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the 
Social Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of International Relations 7 
(4): 525–553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  ). In the wake of the Iraq war, this debate took on an 
increasingly metaphysical character. Russian intellectuals often deploy Western philosophical 
deliberations to claim particularity of knowledge and context, the link between knowledge and 
power, and the critique of proportionality of results and intentions. Critical of the very possibility of 
universalism, a number of Russian intellectuals began to argue that, if the framework of unipolarity 
is to be seen through, the United States and its allies must show the world a new metaphysical 
project that would ultimately serve a universal public good. This project, in their view, should be 
mindful of the Weberian (and Morgenthau’s) dilemma between the ethics of ultimate ends and the 
ethics of responsibility discussed earlier. 
Maria Zakharova claimed in September 2015 that: 
we criticize Western ideology not because we disagree with it. Moreover, we would have accepted 
it, if we saw any tangible results of Western actions in the Middle East during the past ten years. 
What we see now is that no modern prosperous state has emerged in the region so far. The most 
recent refugees crisis in Europe demonstrated the ultimate failure and immoral nature of such 
political practices in the area.1111. Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 
2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw); see note 10 above. 
Kurginyan (2015 Kurginyan, S. 2015. “Kurginyan: SShA—novyi Karfagen, ustraivayushchii khaos po 
vsemu miru [The USA—a New Carthage Making Chaos across the Entire 
World].” regnum.ru, September 30. http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1982223.html ) laments that the 
United States, through its foreign policy actions, is dismantling the paradigm of modernity in those 
areas that need modernity most. He questions, much in the Machiavellian fashion, the balance 
between results and intentions of such policy-making. Kurginyan argues that the process of de-
sovereignization of formerly secular sovereign states of the Middle East during the Western-backed 
Arab Spring aimed to trigger the de-sovereignization dynamic worldwide and could ultimately create 
a new “global disorder.”1212. Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 2015 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw); see note 10 above. See also Kurginyan 
(2015 Kurginyan, S. 2015. “Kurginyan: SShA—novyi Karfagen, ustraivayushchii khaos po vsemu miru 
[The USA—a New Carthage Making Chaos across the Entire World].” regnum.ru, September 
30. http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1982223.html ). He insists that, if the unipolar world model were 
to have a chance of success, its proponents should demonstrate the tangible socio-political benefits 
of such an arrangement. 
Russian intellectuals also shift away from the “just war” ideology, claiming that, while liberal 
democracy might be an effective form of governance, it should not delegitimize alternative forms of 
political being.1313. The medieval doctrine of Just War is often invoked in casual and even academic 
conversations. Yet, its potential dangers are casually ignored. The doctrine splits warring parties 
along “just” and “unjust” lines, thus allowing the “just” side to dehumanize and annihilate the 
adversary (Brown 2007 Brown, C. 2007. “The Twilight of International Morality? Hans J. Morgenthau 
and Carl Schmitt on the End of the Jus Publicum Eurpaeum.” In Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of 
Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, edited by M. Williams, 42–61. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. , 45–50). Hence, stronger states idealize their moral positions and strive to impose 
them on the “morally inferior” enemy covering, at the same time, the advance of their power 
interests (Scheuerman 2007 Scheuerman, W. 2007. “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism 
and Beyond.” In Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, 
edited by M. Williams, 62–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 66). Carl Schmitt, in particular, 
worried that the just war paradigm demolished state sovereignties in those parties that did not 
comply with the overarching, “correct” universalist project. Those parties are treated as “unjust” 
enemies and become subject to annihilation in the course of creating international law of a universal 
nature. Their ideas often echo the laments of Western philosophers that we have examined above. 
Evgenii Tarlo, Professor at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations, insists that Russia is not 
opposed to the idea that the vast majority of nations across the globe embrace democracy as a form 
of government. Yet, he claims that “Russia is against imposition of “democracy” via military methods 
or change of political regimes by sponsoring “color” revolutions, organizing Western-backed political 
movements, and manipulating those countries into the Western geopolitical orbit through uprooting 
economic and politico-cultural systems of those areas.”1414. Tarlo’s comments were made during 
the television broadcast Struktura Momenta, 29 September 2015 
(http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5968/fi40599). Sergei Karaganov, Professor of International 
Relations in the Moscow Higher School of Economics, supports this point by insisting that the direct 
imposition of democracy in the past two decades discredited the very idea of democracy. He claims 
that the situation is similar to the Soviet case, when the idea of Communism was discredited by the 
Soviet Union’s actions in the international arena. “Democracy is a wonderful idea and a political 
system,” Karaganov claims, “but it was made a caricature by Western attempts to spread it forcefully 
across the globe, using it as a dogmatic rhetorical token in political argument, and imposing where it 
was not appropriate or necessary.”1515. Karaganov’s comments were made during the television 
broadcast Pravo Znat, 3 October 2015 (http://www.tvc.ru/channel/brand/id/1756/show/episodes). 
Multipolar and unipolar world architectures: problems and caveats 
Given that the multipolar world architecture seeks to compensate for the shortcomings of 
unipolarity, it seems prudent to devote the final part of this paper to common caveats contained in 
both – multipolar and unipolar – world orders. This could lead us to the sober realization that the 
establishment of the most just world order is still a distant goal. I have selected four main points. 
First, neither the multipolar nor unipolar world order theories provide adequate answers to the 
problem of conflict. While the multipolar architecture strives to assure lasting peace within 
civilizations, it does not rule out conflicts between civilizations. More importantly, such conflicts 
have just as much chance of evolving into the “just war” mode as do contemporary wars that stem 
from the extant order of international conduct. Hence, we can meaningfully construct a co-
operative security system (as defined by Wendt) only within civilizations and thus confront a 
potentially conflictual security system when we refer to inter-civilizational dialog. Cross-civilizational 
interaction does not guarantee peaceful coexistence even though proponents of multipolarity claim 
that dialog and co-operation must be a feature of the inter-civilizational dynamics of recognition 
(Shevchenko et al. 2012 Shevchenko, M., A. Dugin, A. Venediktov, N. Svanidze, 
and S. Govorukhin. 2012. “Natsionalnyi vopros [The Nationality Question].” V Kontekste, January 
26. http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5851/fi13481 ). 
In the unipolar world architecture, this problem also remains unresolved. Although the unipolar 
world structure rests on the Kantian idea of “democratic peace,” a significant number of critics 
charge that “democratic peace” is equated with “privileging liberal states over non-liberal ones and 
justifying imperialistic tendencies of liberal democracies” (Shilliam 2009 Shilliam, R. 2009. German 
Thought and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.10.1057/9780230234154 , p. 
60; see also Doyle 1983 Doyle, M. W. 1983. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 
2.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2): 323–353. ; MacMillan 1995 MacMillan, J. 1995. “A Kantian 
Protest Against the Peculiar Discourse of Inter-Liberal State Peace.” Millennium 24 (3): 549–
562.10.1177/03058298950240030301,  ; Jahn 2005 Jahn, B. 2005. “Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies 
in International Affairs.” International Organisation 59 (1): 177–207.,  ; 
Desch 2007 Desch, M. 2007/2008. “America’s Liberal Illiberalism.” International Security 32 (3): 7–
43.,  ). Desch (2007 Desch, M. 2007/2008. “America’s Liberal Illiberalism.” International Security 32 
(3): 7–43.,  , 13), for example, claims that Kantian political philosophy justifies military intervention 
and political regime change abroad by allowing “republican states the right to end the international 
state of war by forcing other states to embrace republicanism.” Though such charges were subject to 
serious criticism (Cavallar 2001 Cavallar, G. 2001. “Kantian Perspectives on Democratic Peace: 
Alternatives to Doyle.” Review of International Studies 27 (2): 229–248.,  ; Wilson and 
Monten 2011 Wilson, J. L., J. Monten. 2011. “Does Kant Justify Liberal Intervention?” The Review of 
Politics 73 (4): 633–647.10.1017/S0034670511003676 ), rhetoric surrounding some interventions, 
with Iraq being a prime example, pointed at some truths within those theorizations. 
It does not come as a surprise that adherents of both world orders avoided the enactment of Brazil’s 
2011 Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) initiative (Tourinho, Stuenkel, and 
Brockmeier 2016 Tourinho, M., O. Stuenkel, and S. Brockmeier. 2016. ““Responsibility while 
Protecting”: Reforming R2P Implementation.” Global Society 30 (1): 134–
150.10.1080/13600826.2015.1094452[Taylor & Francis Online],  ). Both Russian and Western policy-
makers left the doctrine to academic debate, eschewing intense public discussions. 
The RwP doctrine calls for improvements to the use of force in acts of protection (codified in the 
2005 UN R2P doctrine discussed above) to guard against causing more damage to country where 
intervention occurs. It also calls for the establishment of a set of very specific criteria for the 
authorization of military intervention, thereby preventing use of the R2P doctrine to pursue ulterior 
motives. Finally, the initiative sought to expand the role of the UN Security Council once the use of 
force has been delegated to other parties. The aim of the initiative was to infuse the R2P doctrine 
with a new ethical dimension and to redefine the way in which actors conduct the intervention. 
This RwP doctrine relies on Weber’s ideological chasm between the ethics of ultimate ends and the 
ethics of responsibility. The former relates to an uncompromising just action. From this point of 
view, the moral quality of an act correlates with acting with good intention. The second perspective, 
however, treats acts on the basis of their consequences (Sitton 2003 Sitton, J. 2003. Habermas and 
Contemporary Society. London: Palgrave.10.1057/9781403981493 , 12; 
Weber 2004 Weber, M. 2004. The Vocation Lectures: “Science as a Vocation”; “Politics as a 
Vocation”. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. , 119–122). The main idea here is that 
political actions should be determined by rational considerations dictated by the state’s survival 
pertaining to power politics and not by ethical or “ideal” considerations 
(Mommsen 1984 Mommsen, W. 1984. Max Weber and German Politics 1890–
1920. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. ; Hennis 1988 Hennis, W. 1988. Max Weber: Essays in 
Reconstruction. London: Allen & Unwin. , 79–84; Smith 1990 Smith, M. J. 1990. Realist Thought from 
Weber to Kissinger. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. , 15–16; 
Barkawi 1998 Barkawi, T. 1998. “Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic 
Studies.” Review of International Studies 24 (2): 159–184.10.1017/S0260210598001594,  , 163). 
Hence, the ethics of responsibility contrasts with the universalist ethics of “absolute conviction in 
which only actions ethical from the point of view of one’s ultimate values are undertaken” 
(Barkawi 1998 Barkawi, T. 1998. “Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic 
Studies.” Review of International Studies 24 (2): 159–184.10.1017/S0260210598001594,  , 163). This 
position also invokes the Machiavellian logic that assumes the virtuousness of a policy is defined by 
its outcome: if it is not effective, it cannot be virtuous (Kaplan 2002 Kaplan, R. 2002. Warrior Politics: 
Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Vintage Books. , 53). Therefore, within this 
logic, the morality of results is more important than the morality of intentions.1616. Criticism of 
“absolute conviction” and “just war” doctrines also comes from Morgenthau 
(1948b Morgenthau, H. 1948b. “The Twilight of International Morality.” Ethics 58 (2): 79–
99.10.1086/290596,  ). An intellectual student of Weber, he ponders the link between moral 
intentions and outcomes, arguing that human beings are limited in their ability to predict the results 
of their moral actions. Because of this “natural ability of human intellect” 
(Morgenthau 1945 Morgenthau, H.1945. “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil.” Ethics 56 (1): 1–
18.10.1086/290471,  , 11), good intentions will inevitably go awry. For Morgenthau 
(1945 Morgenthau, H. 1945. “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil.” Ethics 56 (1): 1–
18.10.1086/290471,  , 18; see also Lang 2007 Lang Jr, A. F. 2007. “Morgenthau, Agency, and 
Aristotle.” In Realism Reconsidered, edited by M. Williams, 18–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 
28–29), morally informed political action is possible if one acts within the bounds of the Aristotelian 
virtue of prudence, exercising restraint, political wisdom, moral courage, tempered judgment, and 
consideration of others’ interests. 
It now becomes clear why neither the West, which stands as the main proponent of the unipolar 
world, nor Russia or China that advance the multi-polar world structure, promoted 
the RwP doctrine. All sides quietly reserved the right to advance their geostrategic interests 
(civilizational or unipolar) at the time of conflict and intervention, thus reverting back to positions of 
classical realism. It is indicative that both Russia and the West accused each other of egoistic 
behavior in almost all cases that invoked R2P. Russia pointed to the West’s ulterior motives during 
the campaigns in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Serbia. The West lamented Russia’s 
expansionist initiatives in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, eastern Ukraine, and Crimea. In Syria, where 
both Russia and the US have tangible stakes, the country’s respective officials deploy the higher 
language of “protection” and “fighting terrorism.” At the same time, they often eschew the problem 
of balancing outcomes and intentions as the RwP logic would prescribe. 
Second, both models of world development do not solve the problem of rising managerialism, a lack 
of transparency, and the growing power of large corporations. The unipolar world structure 
invariably leads to a disproportionate increase in the power and political significance of global 
transnational corporations, which could adversely impact not only the population of the periphery 
but also the inhabitants of the center. Given that the system advances the politico-economic 
consensus of global elites lodged in the heart of a single civilization, power could be slowly taken 
away from states, thus depriving governments of the ability to reach political and economic 
decisions that could benefit those states. The system would also be deviating from direct power of 
national governments for indirect governance of international bureaucrats and big business leaders, 
which is invariably less transparent and more elitist. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, for example, grants new rights to global corporations 
in the sphere of intellectual property, patents, and production of pharmaceuticals. It also introduces 
restrictions on state regulation and allows corporations to sue governments (BBC 2016 BBC. 2016. 
“Ceta Talks: EU and Canada Hold Out Hope for Trade Deal.” BBC, October 
24. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37758475  ). The nondemocratic nature of negotiations 
surrounding the Trans-Atlantic Trading and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is another case in point. 
The democratic deficit resulting from these developments could lead to popular resentment, in 
particular in the Western world, whose population is accustomed to high levels of political 
accountability. Vladimir Putin, in his 2016 Valdai speech, pointed to the breakdown of the previous 
politics of consensus that until recently had marked the political systems of most Western states. He 
argued that populations of many of those states often had withdrawn their consent from supra-
national economic elites, global oligarchs, and international bureaucrats, who had not been elected 
but had gained power to influence the dominant discourse (Vzglyad 2016 Vzglyad. 2016. “Putin 
predrek marginalizatsiyu nadnatsional’noi elity.” [Putin Predicts Marginalization of the Supra-
national Elite.] Vzglyad, October 27. ; see also Financial Times 2015 Financial Times. 2015. 
“America’s Middle Class Meltdown: Core Shrinks to Half of US Homes.” Financial Times, December 
9.  ). In other words, he claimed that Western politics is experiencing a political-historical 
conjuncture (to deploy Gramsci’s terminology) at which radically different choices for the political 
future begin to struggle for hegemonic discourse. 
Yet, the multipolar world order is not immune to such problems either. Civilizational unions and 
centers of influence would invariably have similar clusters of supra-national bureaucracy, with strong 
political-economic ambitions and a lack of democratic legitimacy. Corporations could similarly 
influence such bureaucracy and seek its political assistance in the international arena for the 
advancement of their interests. A number of multipolarity proponents in Russia, while advocating 
large civilizational regions, often observe that those regions will have their financial instruments and 
economic elites with private stakes in those territories. Andrei Fursov (2012 Fursov, A. 2012. “Konets 
neoliberal’noi epokhi: Chto dalshe? [The End of the Neoliberal Epoch: What Is to 
Come?].” km.ru, April 4. http://www.km.ru/tv/andrei-fursov-konets-neoliberaln ), an outspoken 
critic of unipolarity, also remains pessimistic about the multipolar construction. He is convinced that 
in the near future the world will be composed of empire-like formations highly influenced by supra-
national bureaucracy, economic elites, and legal enforcement services. Mikhail Delyagin, Russia’s 
eminent left-wing economist, concurs with this idea and laments the natural growth of supra-
national economic elites (Zavtra 2016 Zavtra. 2016. “Globalizatsiya i predatel’stvo elit. Oni zhivut 
pod soboyu ne chuya strany [Globalization and Treason of the Elite. They Live for Themselves, Not 
the Country].” Zavtra, January 14. ). 
Third, both structures are unclear on the issue of civilizational borders. While multipolarity 
theorizations come across as contradictory, the unipolar world structure strives to transcend borders 
altogether, thereby fomenting an entirely different host of problems. I shall deal with the multipolar 
architecture first. On the one hand, proponents of multipolarity argue that cultural-political unions 
could become subjects of international politics and define the future of the globe. This adheres to 
the essentialist approach to culture that claims that as part of a culture people feel strongly attached 
to its features and to sharing a particular way of life (Keesing 1994 Keesing, R. 1994. “Theories of 
Culture Revisited.” In Assessing Cultural Anthropology, edited by R. Borofsky, 301–310. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. , 303). On the other, multi-polarity thinkers endorse the liberal argument that 
cultures are not clearly demarcated and that membership in one culture does not exclude 
membership in another. 
More importantly, multipolarity thinkers often agree with liberals that cultures are not homogenous 
internally and that a person’s cultural identity could be plural rather than singular.1717. For a liberal 
argument, see Tully (1995 Tully, J. 1995. Strange Multiplicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.10.1017/CBO9781139170888 , 10) and Mason (2007 Mason, A. 2007. “Multiculturalism and 
the Critique of Essentialism.” In Multiculturalism and Political Theory, edited 
by Anthony Laden and David Owen, 221–243. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. , 223–
225); for a multipolarity argument, see Sleboda and Dugin (2012 Sleboda, M., and A. Dugin. 2012. 
“Lecture to visiting LSE students at Moscow State University.” April 
20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73Ns1ufuVkQ ), Shevchenko et al. 
(2012 Shevchenko, M., A. Dugin, A. Venediktov, N. Svanidze, and S. Govorukhin. 2012. “Natsionalnyi 
vopros [The Nationality Question].” V Kontekste, January 
26. http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5851/fi13481 ), and Dugin (2012Dugin, A. 2012. The 
Fourth Political Theory. London: Arktos. ). They follow that parts of one civilization could be lodged 
within another, and that borders of such civilizations are fluid due to migration, communication, and 
development (Fursov 2012 Fursov, A. 2012. “Konets neoliberal’noi epokhi: Chto dalshe? [The End of 
the Neoliberal Epoch: What Is to Come?].” km.ru, April 4. http://www.km.ru/tv/andrei-fursov-
konets-neoliberaln ; Sleboda and Dugin 2012 Dugin, A.2012. The Fourth Political 
Theory. London: Arktos. ). This theoretical inconsistency raises some questions. If cultures were to be 
viewed from the essentialist point of view as subjects of international politics, it would be difficult to 
account for their blurry borders and the proclaimed leaning toward eliminating clear cultural 
demarcations. 
The unipolar case presents a different set of issues. Civilizational border issues may surface in the 
sphere of resistance to the universalization of day-to-day life and education. The center would 
invariably attempt to control the dominant discourse of the periphery, offering its own 
interpretation of political, cultural, and historic events through unified media and educational codes. 
This, however, would change cultural, political, and anthropological parameters of societies and 
evoke protest, resistance, and dissent. Hence, the spread of communication, along with unified 
educational and cultural standards, may well lead to the emergence of popular dissent movements, 
attempting to redefine and customize universal matters to local grounds. The Brexit campaign 
literature exemplified popular resistance to the imposition of unified standards on everything from 
education to the smallest household items. 
Fourth, neither the multipolar nor unipolar world constructions could adequately deal with the 
problem of aggressive propagation of civilizational interests (which in the case of unipolarity takes 
the shape of advancing the center’s interests into the periphery), adverse image construction of 
enemies, and hybrid war scenarios. To meet the ends of fairness, multipolarity theorists argue that 
all members of civilizations, when disagreeing with the common civilizational “we,” must be granted 
the right of exit from their civilizations and the opportunity to join other civilizations 
(Fursov 2012 Fursov, A. 2012. “Konets neoliberal’noi epokhi: Chto dalshe? [The End of the Neoliberal 
Epoch: What Is to Come?].” km.ru, April 4. http://www.km.ru/tv/andrei-fursov-konets-neoliberaln ; 
Sleboda and Dugin 2012 Sleboda, M., and A. Dugin. 2012. “Lecture to visiting LSE students at 
Moscow State University.” April 20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73Ns1ufuVkQ ).1818. This 
aligns them with moderate liberal theorists who endorse a “political” conception of liberalism 
rooted in the value of tolerance rather than a comprehensive conception of liberalism rooted in the 
value of autonomy (Hirschman 1970 Hirschman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to 
Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ; 
Galston 1995 Galston, W. 1995. “Two Concepts of Liberalism.” Ethics 105 (3): 516–
534.10.1086/293725,  ; Kymlicka 1997 Kymlicka, W. 1997. Multiculturalism. States, Nations, and 
Cultures. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, Spinoza Lectures. ; Okin 2002 Okin, S. 2002. “Mistresses of Their 
Own Destiny? Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit.” Ethics 112 (2): 205–
230.10.1086/324645,  ). This position, while defending the rights of individuals, is problematic in 
practice. From the essentialist point of view, Kymlicka (1997 Kymlicka, W. 1997. Multiculturalism. 
States, Nations, and Cultures. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, Spinoza Lectures. ) argues that cultures 
have strong influences on people’s subconscious and collective way of life. Threats of exit, if 
plausibly seen through, can ignite serious internal dissent and jeopardize the culture’s survival 
(Hirschman 1970Hirschman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ; Okin 2002 Okin, S. 2002. 
“Mistresses of Their Own Destiny? Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit.” Ethics 112 
(2): 205–230.10.1086/324645,  , 214). If a culture is to survive, the destabilizing impact of internal 
dissent should not become too threatening. Yet, the means, or using Kymlicka’s 
(1997 Kymlicka, W. 1997. Multiculturalism. States, Nations, and Cultures. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 
Spinoza Lectures. , p. 31) term “internal restrictions,” with which civilizations (or cultures) could 
prevent the dissenters from leaving, may vary from persuasion and popularization of the culture’s 
way of life to forcefully restricting the real opportunities for exit 
(Kymlicka 1995 Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 152–
58; Kymlicka 1997Kymlicka, W. 1997. Multiculturalism. States, Nations, and 
Cultures. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, Spinoza Lectures. , 32) or waging hybrid wars with the 
dissenters. 
Indeed, if we were to adopt this concern of internal dissent as serious, it would be logical to consider 
that in a state of anarchy and a conflictual intercivilizational security system, civilizations would 
probably develop financial and geostrategic interests and feel strongly about guarding their 
perceived civilizational borders, along with the right of exit from the civilization’s spheres of cultural 
and political influence. The means and methods of “internal restrictions” may be varied, starting 
from hybrid wars, igniting internal political turmoil, exerting financial pressures, persuasion, 
propaganda, and the like. The conflict over Ukraine perfectly illustrates this point. Set on the border 
between the West European and Russian civilizations, Ukraine became torn by these warring parties. 
This cross-civilizational border conflict demonstrates the potential for war and breakdown of the 
security system as viewed from a civilizational approach to world politics. 
Unipolar constructions emerge from the idea that liberalism would ultimately achieve a post-state 
global civil society based on trade and co-operation. Democracies would not fight each other, opting 
for commercial dialog. Yet, to achieve this condition, all states must become democracies first. The 
globe therefore becomes split into a progressive liberal democratic “core” and an undemocratic 
periphery lagging behind. This construction stresses the question of how liberal states recognize 
each other. Owen (1994 Owen, J.1994. “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.” International 
Security 19 (2): 87–125.10.2307/2539197,  ), Risse-Kapen (1995 Risse-Kapen, T. 1995. “Democratic 
Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal 
Argument.” European Journal of International Relations 1 (4): 491–
517.10.1177/1354066195001004005 ), Oren (1994 Oren, I. 1994. “The Subjectivity of the 
‘Democratic Peace’.” International Security 20 (2): 147–184.,  ), and Williams 
(2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the Social 
Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of International Relations 7 (4): 525–
553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  , 529) raise the question of “what, precisely, do these 
decision-makers look at in deciding that they are part of the shared democratic “us”, and who gets 
to decide?” In this context, Williams (2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic 
Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the Social Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of 
International Relations 7 (4): 525–553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  , 526) concludes that the 
process of recognizing a state as liberal is socially constructed and is invariably linked to “political 
practices entailing and enabling the exercise of considerable power.”1919. To expand this idea, 
Williams (2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the 
Social Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of International Relations 7 
(4): 525–553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  , 542) applies the Kantian logic of recognition 
(Honig 1993 Honig, B. 1993. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. ) to the interstate realm. He notes a subtle but powerful influence on those who 
stand “outside” the liberal community of states. The liberal community proclaims itself open 
(theoretically) to all newcomers and such a universal right of access “allows for the exercise of 
considerable disciplinary power over those who stand outside… By making membership in the 
community a matter of universal right, the withholding of entry into the community can be cast as 
the result of either the willful unworthiness of these others, or as evidence of their as yet insufficient 
progress toward meeting the standards of discipline to which they ought to aspire” 
(Williams 2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the 
Social Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of International Relations 7 
(4): 525–553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  , 542). 
Russian scholars and public opinion-makers often concur with those criticisms. Russia’s eminent film 
director and philosopher Konchalovskii (2016 Konchalovskii, A. 2016. “Interview with Dmitrii Bykov.” 
Konchalovskii prosto rastoptal Bykova [Konchalovskii Simply Chrushes 
Bykov.] balalaika24.ru, October 20. http://balalaika24.ru/society/konchalovskiy-prosto-rastoptal-
bykova ) insists that contemporary Western media have turned into the “Ministry of Truth,” which 
has the power to nominate villains and saviors, proclaim the “right” side of history, and arbitrarily 
judge historic events. He argues that those “truths,” however, invariably exonerate the economic 
and political order constructed by, and in the interests of, the “Anglo-Saxon West.” Vladimir 
Solov’ev, Russia’s leading political TV presenter, concurs by arguing that the democratic West 
habitually neglects injustices occurring in states whose political line conforms with Western 
economic interests (Poedinok 2016 Poedinok. 2016. “Comments by J. Koreiba J. and S. Mikheev in 
the forum “Mikheev vs. Yakub Koreiba.” moderated by V. Solov’ev, V. Poedinok, October 
27. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWQjvGC-9Gw ). Sergei Kurginyan argues that, in the 
construction of a negative image of political enemies, smear campaigns orchestrated by the media 
at the height of international tensions (such as during the Iraq war or the Libyan intervention) 
assume combined forms of medieval inquisition and post-modern political show.2020. See the 
television broadcast Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 2015 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw). 
Russia’s officials point to the same problem, lamenting the West’s contemporary drive to nominate 
Russia as the main source of the world’s political problems. Most such attributions are tied to 
Russia’s intentions to subvert the evolution of a unipolar world and consolidate its influence in 
Europe and the Middle East. Vladimir Markin, a former representative of the Russian Ministry of 
Justice, claims in an article in the Russian conservative daily Izvestiya that the West has launched an 
aggressive information campaign against Russia (Markin 2016 Markin, V. 2016. “Po Zavetam show 
[On the Zavet Show].” Izvestiya, February 17. ). Maria Zakharova goes a step further by arguing that 
the “Russian threat” has turned into a business. Substantial funds have been channeled into expert 
groups, military seminars, training courses, and media campaigns. The US State Department 
allocated some $950 million for these purposes in 2016, while granting Ukraine (the country that 
had actually experienced the Russian threat) just $40 million (RadioVesti 2016 RadioVesti. 2016. 
“Zapad teryaet kontrol nad Turtsiei [The West Is Losing Control Over Turkey (Interview with Maria 
Zakharova)].” RadioVesti.Ru Printsip Deistviya, February 
18. http://radiovesti.ru/episode/show/episode_id/38099 ). Putin repeated these ideas in his 2016 
Valdai speech. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the main dimensions of the ideological roots of the emerging multipolar 
world. It has demonstrated that the idea of multipolarity stems from Western philosophical 
deliberations in defense of the particularity of knowledge, interpretation, and culture. Nineteenth-
century Russian philosophy also has played a decisive role in the evolution of multipolar world ideas. 
The discussion above has shown that Russian thought leaned toward ideas of particularity since its 
inception in both liberal and traditionalist strands. This subsequently led to the civilizational 
approach to world politics and the gradual formation of its geographical dimension. 
The discussion also demonstrated that the main contribution of Russian intellectuals to the debate 
on international relations remains their proposal to shift away from the Western rationalist and 
postmodernist understandings of the subject of international politics and propose civilizations as the 
main subject of international conduct. Hence, large cultural and political spaces would form the core 
of international dialog, promote regional integration, and fend for the particularity of world cultures 
and political forms. Moreover, I have argued that this civilizational ideology has both practical and 
theoretical dimensions, defending traditional ideas of state sovereignty as a contemporary 
guarantee of lasting peace and stability. 
In addition to metaphysical explanations, Russia’s advocacy of multipolarity also has practical 
considerations. The multipolar world arrangement has become one of the most important aspects of 
Russia’s soft power in the global arena and one important instrument for retaining its international 
influence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia deploys the ideas of civilizational particularity 
in defense of its territorial and political integrity and in attempts to curb the advance of global 
democratization and the attendant economic interests of third parties. Russia calls for the 
establishment of strong regional alliances that could assist a supposedly fairer redistribution of 
power and resources across the globe – a process in which Russia could play a decisive role. The 
theory of the multipolar world arrangement could be developed into a stronger and more coherent 
political ideology, given its substantial metaphysical and political basis. Whether this arrangement 
could contribute to longer lasting peace and stability remains an open question, as the comparative 
discussion of both political orders above demonstrates. Yet the study of its main tenets and 
evolution represent a matter of paramount importance for both academics and practical policy-
makers. 
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Notes 
1. Some thinkers might insist that the rift between the multipolar and monopolar world 
architectures boils down to economic factors. Kenneth Waltz argues that the idea of polarity stems 
from applying neoclassical economics to the realm of international relations. At the same time, there 
is a plethora of authors who could, without denying the importance of economic factors, claim the 
utmost significance of ideological variables. It could be argued that the debate over the primacy of 
either economic or ideological factors in the discussion on polarity in international relations is 
reminiscent of the discussion between rationalists and empiricists. This article will accentuate the 
ideological and philosophical line of reasoning and eschew the extensive examination of economic 
factors. 
2. The philosophy of history of Aleksei Khomyakov, the idea of organic cultures of Apollon Grigoriev, 
historiosophy of Nikolay Danilevskii, and anthropology of Nikolai Strakhov have been of particular 
importance. 
3. Peter Chaadaev, while demarcating the division in Russian political thought by arguing that Russia 
has no future without joining the rest of European civilization, still argued at some periods of his life 
that Russia’s distinctness could advance its development. In his later letter to Turgenev, Chaadaev 
(1991 Chaadaev, P. 1991. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pisma [Complete Collected Works 
and Selected Letters]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka. , 98) wrote that Russia has a different 
civilizational origin from Europe: “We do not need to chase someone else. We need to determine 
who we really are. We need to leave the lies behind and reassert ourselves in truth. Then we can 
move forward, and move faster than others because we arrived here later than them but we have all 
their knowledge and experience reflected in centuries of labor that preceded us.” Chernyshevskii 
and other revolutionaries exploited those thoughts of Chaadaev to argue that Russia’s civilizational 
distinctness could help it to organize a socialist revolution and set Russia on the non-capitalist way of 
development (Maslin 2008 Maslin, M. 2008. Istoriya Russkoi filosophii [A History of Russian 
Philosophy]. Moscow: KDU. , 130). 
4. It is interesting that Strakhov adopted the civilizational approach to world politics before 
Danilevskii and independently from him. An editor of the journal Zarya, he published Danilevskii’s 
main work Russia and Europe in 1869 and had been publicly defending it from liberal critics, in 
particular Vladimir Solov’ev. 
5. Eminent historian G. V. Vernadskii (1877–1973), jurist and philosopher N. Alekseev (1879–1964), 
historian and theologian V. N. Il’in (1891–1974), and theologian G. Florovskii (1893–1979) have all 
left a mark in the Eurasian philosophy. 
6. This parallels the idea of diachronic existence developed by Claude Levi-Strauss in his 
anthropological studies. 
7. The fall of the USSR and the dismantling of the “socialist bloc” added an additional layer to this 
system, creating the supposition that Russia’s international standing has been significantly 
weakened relative to the 1970s. At the same time, this additional post-1991 layer can be considered 
cursory, inasmuch as the essence of the five-tier construct remained unchanged. Russia’s 
geopolitical retreat in 1991 has not been institutionalized. No comprehensive document was signed 
that states that Russia was the losing party in the cold war and therefore must, due to this situation, 
assume certain obligations that could restrict its sovereignty or freedom of action in the 
international arena. Russia retained its seat on the UN Security Council, preserved its nuclear 
potential, and inherited the remaining arsenals from the other former Soviet republics. Despite its 
visible economic downturn during the 1990s, Russia remained the only country that possesses the 
scientific-technological and research potential to compete with the United States in the military 
sphere and in the exploration of space (Leont’ev 2015 Leont’ev, M. 2015. “V nachale.” [In the 
Beginning.] RadioVesti.ru, August 10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ku6FNIybN78  ). 
8. Zakharova argues that, in the case of Ukraine, Western powers have been consistently influencing 
domestic politics since the first Orange Revolution of 2004, which is indeed well documented by a 
large number of Western scholars from a variety of perspectives (see Åslund and 
MacFaul 2006 Åslund, A., and M. MacFaul. 2006. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s 
Democratic Breakthrough. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ; 
Lane 2008 Lane, D. 2008. “The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary 
Coup?” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (4): 525–549.10.1111/j.1467-
856x.2008.00343.x,  ). Zakharova also lamented the situation in which high-ranking Western leaders 
frequented the 2014 Maidan rallies and publicly supported the demise of President Victor 
Yanukovich’s government. Furthermore, Western powers did not object to the ousting of 
Yanukovich the day after the German and Polish foreign ministers, as well as a high-ranking French 
Foreign Ministry official, mediated and witnessed the signing with the Yanukovich administration of 
a roadmap toward settling the political crisis. Russian officials argued that, against the backdrop of 
open Western support for political forces beneficial to Western interests, Russia would support its 
own interests and enable the Russian population of Ukraine to pursue its civilizational choice. Hence, 
we are witnessing a clash of geopolitical interests between Russia and the West that is linked to the 
struggle over civilizational spheres of influence. 
9. Professor V. Kotlyar of the Diplomatic Academy of Russia’s Foreign Ministry was particularly vocal 
on this point during a roundtable discussion March 2012 (Kruglyi stol 2012 Kruglyi stol. 2012. 
“Kruglyi stol. Otvetstvennost’ za zashchiti [Roundtable. Responsibility to Protect].” April 
12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VEudC0Ifpt8 ). 
10. Zakharova’s comments were made during the television broadcast Spetsial’nyi 
Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 2015 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw). 
11. Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 2015 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw); see note 10 above. 
12. Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 2015 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw); see note 10 above. See also Kurginyan 
(2015Kurginyan, S. 2015. “Kurginyan: SShA—novyi Karfagen, ustraivayushchii khaos po vsemu miru 
[The USA—a New Carthage Making Chaos across the Entire World].” regnum.ru, September 
30. http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1982223.html ). 
13. The medieval doctrine of Just War is often invoked in casual and even academic conversations. 
Yet, its potential dangers are casually ignored. The doctrine splits warring parties along “just” and 
“unjust” lines, thus allowing the “just” side to dehumanize and annihilate the adversary 
(Brown 2007 Brown, C. 2007. “The Twilight of International Morality? Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl 
Schmitt on the End of the Jus Publicum Eurpaeum.” In Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans J. 
Morgenthau in International Relations, edited by M. Williams, 42–61. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. , 45–50). Hence, stronger states idealize their moral positions and strive to impose them on 
the “morally inferior” enemy covering, at the same time, the advance of their power interests 
(Scheuerman 2007 Scheuerman, W. 2007. “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and 
Beyond.” In Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, 
edited by M. Williams, 62–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 66). Carl Schmitt, in particular, 
worried that the just war paradigm demolished state sovereignties in those parties that did not 
comply with the overarching, “correct” universalist project. Those parties are treated as “unjust” 
enemies and become subject to annihilation in the course of creating international law of a universal 
nature. 
14. Tarlo’s comments were made during the television broadcast Struktura Momenta, 29 September 
2015 (http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5968/fi40599). 
15. Karaganov’s comments were made during the television broadcast Pravo Znat, 3 October 2015 
(http://www.tvc.ru/channel/brand/id/1756/show/episodes). 
16. Criticism of “absolute conviction” and “just war” doctrines also comes from Morgenthau 
(1948b Morgenthau, H. 1948b. “The Twilight of International Morality.” Ethics 58 (2): 79–
99.10.1086/290596,  ). An intellectual student of Weber, he ponders the link between moral 
intentions and outcomes, arguing that human beings are limited in their ability to predict the results 
of their moral actions. Because of this “natural ability of human intellect” 
(Morgenthau 1945Morgenthau, H. 1945. “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil.” Ethics 56 (1): 1–
18.10.1086/290471,  , 11), good intentions will inevitably go awry. For Morgenthau 
(1945 Morgenthau, H. 1945. “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil.” Ethics 56 (1): 1–
18.10.1086/290471,  , 18; see also Lang 2007 Lang Jr, A. F. 2007. “Morgenthau, Agency, and 
Aristotle.” In Realism Reconsidered, edited by M. Williams, 18–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 
28–29), morally informed political action is possible if one acts within the bounds of the Aristotelian 
virtue of prudence, exercising restraint, political wisdom, moral courage, tempered judgment, and 
consideration of others’ interests. 
17. For a liberal argument, see Tully (1995 Tully, J. 1995. Strange Multiplicity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139170888 , 10) and Mason (2007 Mason, A. 2007. 
“Multiculturalism and the Critique of Essentialism.” In Multiculturalism and Political Theory, edited 
by Anthony Laden and David Owen, 221–243. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. , 223–
225); for a multipolarity argument, see Sleboda and Dugin (2012 Sleboda, M., and A. Dugin. 2012. 
“Lecture to visiting LSE students at Moscow State University.” April 
20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73Ns1ufuVkQ ), Shevchenko et al. 
(2012 Shevchenko, M., A. Dugin, A. Venediktov, N. Svanidze, and S. Govorukhin. 2012. “Natsionalnyi 
vopros [The Nationality Question].” V Kontekste, January 
26. http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5851/fi13481 ), and Dugin (2012 Dugin, A. 2012. The 
Fourth Political Theory. London: Arktos. ). 
18. This aligns them with moderate liberal theorists who endorse a “political” conception of 
liberalism rooted in the value of tolerance rather than a comprehensive conception of liberalism 
rooted in the value of autonomy (Hirschman 1970 Hirschman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: 
Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. ; Galston 1995 Galston, W. 1995. “Two Concepts of Liberalism.” Ethics 105 (3): 516–
534.10.1086/293725,  ; Kymlicka 1997 Kymlicka, W. 1997. Multiculturalism. States, Nations, and 
Cultures. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, Spinoza Lectures. ; Okin 2002 Okin, S. 2002. “Mistresses of Their 
Own Destiny? Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit.” Ethics 112 (2): 205–
230.10.1086/324645,  ). 
19. To expand this idea, Williams (2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: 
Kant, Liberalism, and the Social Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of 
International Relations 7 (4): 525–553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  , 542) applies the Kantian 
logic of recognition (Honig 1993 Honig, B. 1993. Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ) to the interstate realm. He notes a subtle but powerful 
influence on those who stand “outside” the liberal community of states. The liberal community 
proclaims itself open (theoretically) to all newcomers and such a universal right of access “allows for 
the exercise of considerable disciplinary power over those who stand outside… By making 
membership in the community a matter of universal right, the withholding of entry into the 
community can be cast as the result of either the willful unworthiness of these others, or as 
evidence of their as yet insufficient progress toward meeting the standards of discipline to which 
they ought to aspire” (Williams 2001 Williams, M. 2001. “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: 
Kant, Liberalism, and the Social Construction of Security Communities.” European Journal of 
International Relations 7 (4): 525–553.10.1177/1354066101007004006,  , 542). 
20. See the television broadcast Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent with Evgenii Popov, on 29 September 
2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw). 
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